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## **OFFICE OF PETITIONS**

In re Application of	:	
Roger Moczygemb	:	
Application No. 10/003,361	:	DECISION ON PETITION
Filed: November 15, 2001	:	
Attorney Docket No. P-120971.01 (uti)	:	

This is a decision on the petition under the unintentional provisions of 37 CFR 1.137(b), filed September 26, 2008, to revive the above-identified application.

The petition is **DISMISSED**.

Any request for reconsideration of this decision must be submitted within TWO (2) MONTHS from the mail date of this decision. Extensions of time under 37 CFR 1.136(a) are permitted. The reconsideration request should include a cover letter entitled "Renewed Petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b)." This is not a final agency action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 704.

The application became abandoned for failure to reply in a timely manner to the non-final Office action mailed February 7, 2006, which set a shortened statutory period for reply of three (3) months. No extensions of time under the provisions of 37 CFR 1.136(a) were obtained. Accordingly, the application became abandoned on May 8, 2006. A Notice of Abandonment was mailed August 28, 2006.

A grantable petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b) must be accompanied by: (1) the required reply, unless previously filed; (2) the petition fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.17(m); (3) a statement that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) was unintentional; and (4) any terminal disclaimer (and fee as set forth in 37 CFR 1.20(d)) required by 37 CFR 1.137(d). Where there is a question as to whether either the abandonment or the delay in filing a petition under 37 CFR 1.137 was unintentional, the Director may require additional information. See MPEP 711.03(c)(II)(C) and (D). The instant petition lacks item (3).

There are three periods to be considered during the evaluation of a petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b):

- (1) the delay in reply that originally resulted in the abandonment;
- (2) the delay in filing an initial petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) to revive the application; and
- (3) the delay in filing a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) to revive the application.

Currently, the delay has not been shown to the satisfaction of the Director to be unintentional for periods (1) and (2).

As to Period (1):

The patent statute at 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(7) authorizes the Director to revive an "unintentionally abandoned application." The legislative history of Public Law 97-247 reveals that the purpose of 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(7) is to permit the Office to have more discretion than in 35 U.S.C. §§ 133 or 151 to revive abandoned applications in appropriate circumstances, but places a limit on this discretion, stating that "[u]nder this section a petition accompanied by either a fee of \$500 or a fee of \$50 would not be granted where the abandonment or the failure to pay the fee for issuing the patent was intentional as opposed to being unintentional or unavoidable." [emphasis added]. See H.R. Rep. No. 542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 770-71. The revival of an intentionally abandoned application is antithetical to the meaning and intent of the statute and regulation.

35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(7) authorizes the Director to accept a petition "for the revival of an unintentionally abandoned application for a patent." As amended December 1, 1997, 37 CFR 1.137(b)(3) provides that a petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b) must be accompanied by a statement that the delay was unintentional, but provides that "[t]he Commissioner may require additional information where there is a question whether the delay was unintentional." Where, as here, there is a question whether the initial delay was unintentional, the petitioner must meet the burden of establishing that the delay was unintentional within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(7) and 37 CFR 1.137(b). See In re Application of G, 11 USPQ2d 1378, 1380 (Comm'r Pats. 1989); 37 CFR 1.137(b). Here, in view of the inordinate delay (over two years) in resuming prosecution, there is a question whether the entire delay was unintentional. Petitioner should note that the issue is not whether some of the delay was unintentional by any party; rather, the issue is whether the entire delay has been shown to the satisfaction of the Director to be unintentional.

The question under 37 CFR 1.137(b) for period (1) is whether the delay on the part of the party having the right or authority to reply to avoid abandonment (or not reply) was unintentional. Accordingly, any renewed petition must clearly identify the party having the right to reply to avoid abandonment on May 8, 2006. That party, in turn must explain what effort(s) was made to further reply to the outstanding Office action and, further, why no reply was filed. If no effort was made to further reply, then that party must explain why the delay in this application does not result from a deliberate course of action (or inaction). Likewise, as Cline H. White of Jackson Walker L.L.P. was counsel of record at the time of abandonment, he should explain why this application became abandoned while it was under his control and what efforts were made to further reply of itself and with whom this matter was discussed outside of the practice of Jackson Walker L.L.P. Copies of any correspondence relating to the filing, or to not filing a further reply to the outstanding Office action are required from responsible person(s), Cline H. White and whoever else was involved with this application at the time of abandonment. Statements are required from any and all persons then at Jackson Walker L.L.P., and the responsible person(s) having firsthand knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the lack of a reply to the outstanding Office action. As the courts have made clear, it is pointless for the USPTO to revive a long abandoned application without an adequate showing that the delay did not result from a deliberate course of action. See Lawman Armor v. Simon, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10843, 74 USPQ2d 1633 (DC EMich 2005); Field Hybrids, LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1159 (D. Minn Jan. 27, 2005); Lumenyte Int'l Corp. v. Cable Lite Corp., Nos. 96-1011, 96-1077, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 16400, 1996 WL 383927 (Fed. Cir. July 9, 1996) (unpublished) (patents held unenforceable due to a finding of inequitable conduct in submitting an inappropriate statement that the abandonment was unintentional).

As to Period (2):

Likewise, where the applicant deliberately chooses not to seek or persist in seeking the revival of an abandoned application, or where the applicant deliberately chooses to delay seeking the revival of an abandoned application, the resulting delay in seeking revival of the abandoned application cannot be considered as "unintentional" within the meaning of 37 CFR 1.137(b). See MPEP 711.03(c).

The language of both 35 U.S.C. § 41(a)(7) and 37 CFR 1.137(b) are clear and unambiguous, and, furthermore, without qualification. That is, the delay in filing the reply during prosecution, as well as in filing the petition seeking revival, must have been, without qualification, "unintentional" for the reply to now be accepted on petition. The Office requires that the entire delay be at least unintentional as a prerequisite to revival of an abandoned application to prevent abuse and injury to the public. See H.R. Rep. No. 542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 771 ("[i]n order to prevent abuse and injury to the public the Commissioner . . . could require applicants to act promptly after becoming aware of the abandonment"). The December 1997 change to 37 CFR 1.137 did not create any new right to overcome an intentional delay in seeking revival, or in renewing an attempt at seeking revival, of an abandoned application. See Changes to Patent Practice and Procedure; Final Rule Notice, 62 Fed. Reg. 53131, 53160 (October 10, 1997), 1203 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 63, 87 (October 21, 1997), which clearly stated that any protracted delay (here, over two years) could trigger, as here, a request for additional information. As the courts have since made clear, a protracted delay in seeking revival, as here, requires a petitioner's detailed explanation seeking to excuse the delay as opposed to USPTO acceptance of a general allegation of unintentional delay. See Lawman Armor v. Simon, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10843, 74 USPQ2d 1633, at 1637-8 (DC EMich 2005); Field Hybrids, LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1159 (D. Minn Jan. 27, 2005) at \*21-\*23. Statements are required from any and all persons then at the practice of Jackson Walker L.L.P. and the responsible person(s) having firsthand knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the protracted delay, after the abandonment date, in seeking revival.

As noted in MPEP 711.03(c)(II), subsection D, in instances in which such petition was not filed within 1 year of the date of abandonment of the application, applicants should include:

- (A) the date that the applicant first became aware of the abandonment of the application; and
- (B) a showing as to how the delay in discovering the abandoned status of the application occurred despite the exercise of due care or diligence on the part of the applicant.

In either instance, applicant's failure to carry the burden of proof to establish that the "entire" delay was "unavoidable" or "unintentional" may lead to the denial of a petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b), regardless of the circumstances that originally resulted in the abandonment of the application. See also New York

**University v. Autodesk**, 2007 U.S. DIST LEXIS, U.S. District LEXIS 50832, \*10-\*12 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)(protracted delay in seeking revival undercuts assertion of unintentional delay).

It is not apparent whether the statement of unintentional delay was signed by a person who would have been in a position of knowing that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to 37 CFR 1.137(b) was unintentional. Nevertheless, in accordance with 37 CFR 10.18, the statement is accepted as constituting a certification of unintentional delay. However, in the event that petitioner has no knowledge that the delay was unintentional, petitioner must make such an inquiry to ascertain that, in fact, the delay was unintentional. If petitioner discovers that the delay was intentional, petitioner must notify the Office. It is not apparent whether the person signing the instant petition was ever given a power of attorney or authorization of agent to prosecute this patent. In accordance with 37 CFR 1.34(a), the signature appearing on the petition shall constitute a representation to the United States Patent and Trademark Office that he/she is authorized to represent the particular party in whose behalf he/she acts. While, a courtesy copy of this decision is being mailed to the person signing the instant petition, all future correspondence will be directed to the address currently of record until such time as appropriate instructions are received to the contrary.

Any renewed petition may be addressed as follows:

By Mail: Mail Stop PETITION  
Commissioner for Patents  
P. O. Box 1450  
Alexandria, VA 22313-1450

By hand: U. S. Patent and Trademark Office  
Customer Service Window, Mail Stop Petitions  
Randolph Building  
401 Dulany Street  
Alexandria, VA 22314

The centralized facsimile number is (571) 273-8300.

Correspondence regarding this decision may also be filed through the electronic filing system of the USPTO.

To expedite consideration, petitioner may wish to contact the undersigned regarding the filing of the renewed petition under 37 CFR 1.137(b).

Telephone inquiries concerning this decision should be directed to Joan Olszewski at (571) 272-7751.

/Liana Walsh/  
Liana Walsh  
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Office of Petitions

cc: Nick A Nichols, Jr.  
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